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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Jan. 7, 1983 Conference
List 5, Sheet 1
No. 82-618
KOSAK (tort pl.)

Cert to CA3 (Aldisert, Becker:
Weis, diss.)

v.
UNITED STATES

Federal/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY: Petr contends that a provision of the Federal Tort
Claims Act barring claims "in respect of ••• the detention of any
goods ••• by any officer of customs" does not preclude a claim
against the

u.s.

for negligent and careless damage to property

while in the custody of the Customs Service.

(

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: In 1978, Customs agents seized
certain antiques and objects
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art from petr's home.
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later charged with smuggling goods into the

u.s.

in violation of

18 U.S.C. §545, based on the charge that he had entered the goods
on a customs declaration as being for his own art collection,
rather than resale.

He was acquitted.

The goods were returned

to petr, but he contended that certain items had been damaged as
a result of Customs Service negligence during their detention.
He brought an action in DC (ED Pa, Hannum), seeking $12,310 in
damages.
The DC dismissed.

Although the order does not set forth the

reason for dismissal, the DC apparently accepted the Government's
argument that the action was precluded by a section of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28

(

u.s.c.

§2680(c), which

provides that tort immunity remains in effect for "[a]ny claim
arising in respect of ••• the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs."
The CA3 affirmed, in a divided opinion.

Judge Aldisert, for

the majority, acknowedged that courts are divided in their
interpretation of the section.

In 1958, the CA2 held that

§2680(c) applies only to claims based on injury caused by the
detention itself, and not to losses caused by Customs Service
negligent handling of goods during detention, Alliance Assurnce
Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (CA2 1958).

This approach was

followed by A-Mark Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d
849 (CA9 1978), and discussed with approval in A & D
International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669 (CAS 1982).

(

Other courts have interpreted S2680(c) more broadly, see United
States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372 (CAll

1981)7 United States v. One {1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat,
501 F.2d _1327, 1330 (CAS 1974).

The Supreme Court recognized

this split in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444

u.s. 460

(1980), but did not express any view on which interpretation was
correct.
The majority opted for the latter approach.

That

interpretation is in keeping with the clear language of the
statute1 the legislative history, which indicates no intention
contrary to the clear language of the statute: the purposes of
the statutory scheme: and the conclusion of this Court that
"clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity" is needed before an
exception will be made to the language of the FTCA, Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953).
Judge Weis, dissenting, contended that the holding of the
majority would produce anomalous results, in which negligent
damage to a person's property during customs inspection would be
actionable, but the same damage during a period of detention of
the goods would not.

The dissent quoted other language from

Dalehite, supra, calling for strict interpretation of the
exceptions to the FTCA.

Here, the conduct is within the outer

limits of the FTCA, so the exception in §2680(c) must be
carefully examined.

That subsection refers to a claim "arising

in respect of" the detention of goods, not a claim "arising out
of" such detention.

That distinction is important.

"The United

States had a legal right to detain the ••• property without

(

liability for the damages which might be causedby the denial of

'

'

I

possession.

However, the government is not immune from liability

for the harm it did to the property while it was being detained."
CONTENTIONS: Petr--The split in the circuits warrants
review.

In Hatzlachh, the Court referred to the existence of

other remedies1 yet in this case no other remedy exists, and a
property-owner would have no recourse even if the Customs Service
deliberately destroyed his property while it was being detained.
For the reasons set forth by the dissent and the conflicting
opinions, the majority was wrong.
Resp (SG)--The majority was correct1 the plain meaning of
the statute compels the result below.

(

In any event, the action

is not worthy of review.

Although there is a conflict, the issue

arises only sporadically.

(Because of the insignificance of the

issue, the SG declined to seek review in the CA9 case reaching
the opposite result.)

Moreover, alternative remedies exist.

Petr could bring an action against the customs collector
personally, and might be able to bring an action for breach of
contract.
DISCUSSION: I recommend denial.

There is a clear conflict1

and neither interpretation of the statute seems correct beyond
all doubt.

Furthermore, the alternative remedies strike me as

largely inadequate--lack of evidence would likely render very
difficult a direct action against the customs collector

v

personally, and the SG notes that it is highly uncertain whether
a breach of contract remedy is available.

(

-

Nevertheless, the SG

seems correct that the issue arises only sporadically1 and I do

""

/

not believe that this conflict is important enough to warrant
review.
There is a response.
December 18, 1982
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Question Presented

Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes a claim against
the United States for negligent damage to property siezed by the
Customs Service.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Statutes

The two provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act that are
relevant to this case are 28

u.s.c.

§§1346(b) and 2680.

Section

1346 provides:
" [T] he district courts. • . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages... for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scop€ of his
office or ern lo ent, , unaer circumstances where the
United States, if a pr0vate person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."
Section 2680 provides:
"The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to ...

--

(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage,
or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or\
collec£lon ~any tax or customs duty, or thekdetention'
of an
oods or merchandise b
an officer of customs
or excise or any other law-enforcement o ficer."

B.

Facts

When petr returned from a naval assignment in Guam, he sent
back

to

the United

The Customs

Service,

States a number of pieces of oriental art.
suspecting

that he had

brought

the

i terns

into the United States for resale, obtained a search warrant and

seized

the

smuggling.
objects.

i terns.

After

a

jury

trial,

petr

was

acquitted

of

He then asked the Customs Service to return his art
When the Customs service finally got around to return-

ing petr's belongings, petr discovered that some of the items had
b~d.

c.

Decisions Below

Petr

filed

suit

in

federal

district

court

seeking

over

$12,000 from the federal government because of the damage to his
belongings.

The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the

ground

the Federal Tort Claims Act does not allow a

that

against

the

Government

Customs Service.
The
§2680(c)

~3
as

for

damage

to property detained

suit

by the

v'""

The DC granted the motion.

affirmed.

The CA3 looked to the plain language of

supporting

the DC's decision.

That section states

that a party cannot sue the Government for "[a]ny claim arising
in respect of

•.. the detention of any goods or merchandise by

any officer of customs .••• "

The CA3 noted that nothing in the

language of the statute or its legislative history indicates that
Congress meant

to allow a

suit against

customs official has been negligent.

the government where a

The CA3 refused

to infer

such a rule because of this Court's admonition that courts should
find a waiver of sovereign immunity only where congressional in/ tent

is clear.

(1953).
CA2's

See Dalehite v. United States,

346

u.s.

15, 31

The CA3 recognized that its decision conflicts with the

holding

in Alliance Assurance Co.

v.

United

States,

252

~

•.

F.2d 529

In Alliance, the CA2 concluded that the probaIL
u
ble ~ ~= e of §2680 (c) was to prohibit actions for conversion

arising

(1958).

from

a

denial by

----------------

~

the customs authorities of

immediate right of use of the siezed property.

another's

Therefore, Con-

gress did not intend to bar actions based on the negligent injury
of goods in the possession or control of the customs authorities.
The CA3 found the CA2's reasoning unpersuasive.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's Contentions

Petr contends that the plain language of §2680 (c)

indicates

-

that it was intended only to apply to damages to property resultIt

\

ing from the retention of the property.

Petr supports his posi-

tion by referring to the legislative history and policies behind
the

exceptions

contained

in §2680.

Petr

also notes

that when

Congress wanted to exempt certain negligent acts by the postal
service,
in

§2680,

it did so expressly.
Congress

revealed

against the Government.
proper

as

to

By failing to mention negligence
its

desire

to

allow

such

actions

Petr also argues that dismissal was im-

two damaged or missing

items even if

§2680 (c)

is

given a broad interpretation, because these items were not "detained" and one item was not "goods or merchandise."

I'

.,.
~'

Contentions

The SG also relies on the plain language and legislative history of

the statute.

The SG contends that, by using the terms

-

"any claim" and "in respect of," Congress expressed the intention
that §2680(c) receive the broadest possible interpretation.
an

interpretation

§2680 (c).

First,

is

consistent

with

Second,

,

..

~

in order

to operate effi-

it would be difficult for the Customs Service

to defend against suits of this nature.
fraudule~t ~uits

~ licies] behind

the customs service is a core activity of the

Government which should be protected
ciently.

the

Such

is great.

~....... ~::w.::.---

Third, the potential for

Finally, plaintiffs have another ave-

nue of relief--negligence actions against individual customs inspectors.
tion

The SG sees no merit to petr's argument that the mo-

to dismiss

should

not have applied to two

items.

The SG

submits that petr did not raise this issue in the courts below.

c.

Analysis

As mentioned above both parties rely on the plain meaning and
legislative history of §2680.

The parties' disagreement regard-

ing the meaning of the words used in the statute stems from the
emphasis petr puts on the word "detention" and the emphasis that
the SG puts on the term "any claim arising in respect of."
statute
whole,

is
I

slightly

think

ambiguous,

the SG's

but,

taking

the

language

interpretation is correct.

The
as

a

The phrase

U:r
~

"any claims in respect of •.. the detention of goods or merchan-

....~·

~

...

dise" connotes to me that Congress intended to be all-inclusive.
Such a reading of §2680 (c)

would also comport with the general

rule of statutory construction that waivers of sovereign immunity
should

u.s.

be

narrowly construed.

Dalehite

v.

United

States,

346

15, 31 (1953).
The

parties

history there

is

apparently

agree

that

what

little

legislative

indicates that the reference to customs offi-

cials in §2680(c) was included in that provision is that Congress
thought that those parties aggrieved by the acts of customs officials had alternative avenues of recovery.
Co. v. United States, 444

u.s.

See Hatzlachh Supply

460, 463 n.4 (1980).

Unfortunate-

ly, the parties cannot agree on whether the alternative remedies
relied on in 1940 still exists.

Petr states that there are "no

particular statutory procedures for
loss

or

damage

officers."

to

goods

while

the recovery of damages for
in

the

custody

of

Customs

The SG cites to several cases that have held that a

customs collector is a "quasi-bailee" of seized goods and can be
held

personally liable

Thomas,

82

u.s.

for

(15 Wall.)

negligence,
337,

citing United States v.

342-343

(1873);

States Marine

Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1149 (1974).
cases seems to bear out the SG's position,
legislative history of §2680 (c)
the outcome of this case.

Although the

I do not think

the

is substantial enough to govern

Both parties base their

interpreta-

tions of the legislative history on the testimony of one witness
who testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in 1940. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages •

.

.'

•'

'.

4),.,. . . .

,

·'

,I

Even if the alternative avenues of relief envisionsed by Congress
in

1940

should

no

longer

existed,

not dictate an

the

testimony

interpretation of

of

a

single

witness

§2680 that contradicts

the plain language of that statute.
Petr
least t! o

is

not

alone

his

circuits ~ a~ead

----

for

in

conversion arising

interpretation of

§2680 (c).

§2680(c) as only applying to

from

the denial of

the

At

a~tions

use of property

See A-Mark, Inc. v. United States ~

following a wrongful seizure.

Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (1978); Alliance Assurance Co.
v. United States,

252 F.2d 529, 534

(1958).

The only evidence

of congressional intent cited by these courts is the juxtaposition of §2680(c) and §2680(b).

Section 2680(b) bars suits "aris-

ing out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of
mail.

The A-Mark

and Alliance courts

reference to negligence in §2680(b)
used like language in §2680(c)

reasoned

that Congress's

indicates that it would have

if it had intended for that sec-

tion to bar actions for the negligent handling of seized goods.
I agree with the SG that a better explanation for Congress's
decision to use narrower language in §2680(b)
§2680 (c)

than that used in

is that Congress did not want to bar all suits related

to the transmission of mail.

For instance, Congress did not want

to bar suits arising out of automobile accidents involving negligent postal employees.

As written, §2680(b) focuses on lost and

1 The SG also cites a report authored by the witness (the
Holtzoff Report), but concedes that there is no evidence that the
report was ever submitted to Congress.

C:/{s?

damaged letters and packages.

Thus, the narrow scope of §2680(b)

does not suggest that Congress intended §2680(c) to have a narrow
scope as well.

In fact, Congress's use of narrower language when

it served a legislative purpose suggests that Congress would have
expressly limited the application of §2680(c) if that's what Congress had had in mind.
The

SG also discusses

several

policy

reasons

for

suits against the Government in this sort of situation.

barring
In par-

ticular, the SG points to the difficulty of defending such suits
and the potential for

fraud.

These arguments apply equally to

any number of areas in which the Government has waived its sovereign immunity.
wise

in

The important question is not whether Congress is

waiving

immunity,

but

whether

Congress

has

made

that

choice.
Perhaps the strongest argument the petr can make is a general
fairness argument.
is

responsible

for

In most situations, if a government employee
the

negligent

destruction

of

property, the Government can be held responsible.

a

civilian's

In this case,

petr cannot sue the government. Furthermore, filing suit against
the negligent employee would be fairly impracticable.

Petr would

have difficulty establishing a chain of custody and specific evidence of negligent activities would be hard to come by.

Even if

you accept these dire consequences as true, the balancing of the
equities against the Government's interest in staying out of such
suits is the business of Congress, rather than the courts.

In

the

to

absence

of

any

concrete

allow suits of

this

nature,

evidence
I

think

that

Congress

wanted

the plain language of

the

statute

indicates

that Congress wanted to preserve the Govern-

ment's traditional immunity from suit.
Petr's contentions regarding the applicability of §2680(c) to
two minor items seized by the Customs Service is barely worthy of
mention.

Petr did not raise these issues in the lower cours and

I doubt that the Court granted cert to consider these fact-bound
and unimportant questions.

III. CONCLUSION

The

result

reached

by

appearance, seems correct.

the CA3,

although

somewhat harsh

in

The plain meaning of the statute bars

petr's suit against the Government.

A change in this result must

await action by Congress.

~

.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-618

JOSEPH A. KOSAK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether 28 U. S. C.
§ 2680(c), which exempts from the coverage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act "[a]ny claim arising in respect of ... the ~
tention of any goods or mechandise by an officer of customs," precludes recovery against the United tates for injury to private property sustained during a temporary
detention of the property by the Customs Service.
I

While a serviceman stationed in Guam, petitioner assembled a large collection of oriental art. When he was transferred from Guam to Philadelphia, petitioner brought his art
collection with him. In his customs declaration, 1 petitioner
stated that he intended to keep the contents of the collection
for himself. Subsequently, acting upon information that,
contrary to his representations, petitioner planned to resell
portions of his collection, agents of the United States Customs Service obtained a valid warrant to search petitioner's
house. In executmg that warrant, the agents seized various
antiques and other objects of art.
Petr was charged with smuggling his art collection into the
country, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 545. After a jury trial,
' Because Guam is outside the customs territory of the United States, all
goods imported therefrom are subject to duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1202.

~
I

/:2. S'
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he was acquitted. The Customs Service then notified petitioner that the seized objects were subject to civil forfeiture
under 19 U. S. C. § 1592 (1976),~itted
confiscation of goods brought into the United States "by
means of any false statement." Relying on 19 U. S. C.
§ 1618, petitioner filed a petition for relief from the forfeiture. 2 The Customs Service granted the petition and returned the goods.
Alleging that some of the objects returned to him had been
~~~d while in the custody of the Customs Service, peti~
tioner filed an administrative complaint with the Service requestmg compe sation
e a ge. The Customs Service denied relief. Relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, petitioner then filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, seeking approximately $12,000 in damages for
the alleged injury to his property. 3 The Government moved
for a dismissal of the complaint or for summary judgment on
the ground that petitioner's claim was barred by § 2680(c).
The District Court granted the Government's motion. 4
2
Section 1618 permits the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or mitigate a forfeiture "if he finds that such ... forfeiture was incurred without
willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to
defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such
mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such
... forfeiture .... "
3
Petitioner also requested damages for two other alleged injuries related to the seizure and detention of his property: the destruction of a cork
pagoda by customs officials during the search of petitioner's house, and the
accidental seizure of a sales receipt for a stereo receiver (without which petitioner was unable to obtain warranty repairs). App. at 6-7. In his
brief, petitioner argues that these two claims are segregable from his primary claim for damages resulting from the injury to the detained goods and
merit separate analysis. Because petitioner did not present this argument
to the Court of Appeals, we decline to consider it. See Neely v. Martin K.
Eby Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317, 330 (1967).
'Civil Action No. 81-2054 (ED Pa. Oct. 15, 1981). The District Court
did not identify the grounds for its ruling. We see no reason to doubt the

82-629-0PINION
KOSAK v. UNITED STATES

3

The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed.
679 F. 2d 306 (CA3 1982). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the United States may be hel liab e for torts committed
by its emp oyees n on t e basis of a sta utory provision
evincmg a 'c ear relin uishment of sovereign immunity."
ld., at 309. In the court's v1ew, e e era ort Claims
Act, as qualified by § 2680(c), fails to provide the necessary
relinquishment of Governmental immunity from suits alleging that customs officials damaged or lost detained property.
On the contrary, the court observed, the "clear language" of
§ 2680(c) shields the United States from "all claims arising out
of detention of goods by customs officers and does not purport to distinguish among types of harm." I d., at 308. On
that basis, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits
regarding the liability of the United States for injuries
caused by the negligence of customs officials in handling
property in their possession. 5 - - U. S. - - (1983). We
now affirm.
II
A

The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, provides
generally that the United States shall be liable, to the same
inference drawn by the Court of Appeals that the District Court was persuaded by the Government's argument that§ 2680(c) barred the suit. 679
F. 2d 306, 307 and n. 2. It would have been better practice, however, for
the District Court to have noted the reasons for its judgment.
5
In three cases, Courts of Appeals have construed § 2680(c) in ways
that would not bar petitioner's suit. A & D International, Inc. v. United
States, 665 F. 2d 669 (CA5 1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret
Service, 593 F. 2d 849 (CA9 1978); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United
States, 252 F. 2d 529 (CA2 1958). In two other cases, Courts of Appeals
have read the provision as did the Third Circuit in this case. United
States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F. 2d 1372 (CAll 1981);
United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F. 2d 1327
(CA5 1974). In Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 462

( t
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extent as a private party, "for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28
U. S. C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2674. The Act's
broad waiver of sovereign immunity is, however, subject to
13 enumerated exceptions. 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a}-(n). One
of those exceptions, § 2680(c), exempts from the coverage of
the statute "[a]ny claim arising in respect of ... the detention of any goods or mechandise by any officer of customs .... " 6 Petitioner asks us to construe the foregoing
language to cover only claims "for damage caused by the detention itself and not for the negligent . . . destruction of
property while it is in the possession of the customs service."
By "damage caused by the detention itself," petitioner appears to mean harms attributable to an illegal detention, such
as a decline in the economic value of detained goods (either
because of depreciation or because of a drop in the price the
goods will fetch), injury resulting from deprivation of the
ability to make use of the goods during the period of detention, or consequential damages resulting from lack of access
to the goods. 7 The Government asks us to read the excepn. 3 (1980), we acknowledged the divergence in the views of the circuits but
expressly declined to decide the issue.
6
The full text of § 2680(c) provides:
"The provisions of [28 U. S. C. §§ 2671-2680] and of§ 1346(b) shall not
apply to(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax
or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer."
We have no occasion in this case to decide what kinds of "law-enforcement officer[s]," other than customs officials, are covered by the exception.
7
In view of the fact that the Tort Claims Act permits recovery only of
"money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death," 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), it is unclear whether, even in the absence of
§ 2680(c), any of the foregoing sorts of damage would be recoverable under
the Act. Cf., e. g., Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Department
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tion to cover all injuries to property sustained during its detention by customs officials. 8
The starting point of our analysis of these competing interpretations must of course be the language of § 2680(c).
"[W]e assume 'that the legislative purpose is ex ressed by
the or mary mearung o t e words used."' American Tobacco Co. v. "Pafterson, <156 0. S. '03, 68 (1982)(quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). 9 At first blush,
of the Army, 666 F. 2d 444 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, -U.S. (1982); County of San Diego v. Castillo, 665 F. 2d 1051 (CA9 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U. S. 1018 (1982) (both cases adopting restrictive interpretations of the language of § 1346(b)). If the sorts of damages that, under
petitioner's theory, are covered by § 2680(c) would not be recoverable in
any event because of the limitation built into § 1346(b), § 2680(c) would be
mere surplusage. The unattractiveness of such a construction of the statute, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979), would cast considerable doubt on petitioner's position. However, because the question of
the scope of § 1346(b) has not been briefed or argued in this case, we decline to rely on any inferences that might be drawn therefrom in our decision today.
8
Because petitioner conceded below that the injuries to his property occurred after it had been lawfully detained by customs officers, we need not
consider the meaning of the term "detention" as used in the statute.
9
The Court of Appeals, while properly emphasizing the plain language
of § 2680(c) as the basis for its ruling, suggested that the structure of the
Tort Claims Act should affect how that language is read. Relying on the
principles that "sovereign immunity is the rule, and that legislative departures from the rule should be strictly construed," the Court of Appeals suggested that§ 2680(c), as an exception from a statute waiving sovereign immunity, should be broadly construed. 679 F. 2d, at 308-09. We find such
an approach unhelpful. Though the Court of Appeals is certainly correct
that the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act should not be read in a way that
would "nullifly them] through judicial interpretation," id., at 309, unduly
generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the
central purpose of the statute. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U. S. 543, 548 n. 5 (1951); cf. Block v. Neal, U. S. - , (1983)
("'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.'") (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30
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the statutory language certainly appears expansive enough
to support the Government's construction; the encompassing
phrase, "arising in respect to," seems to sweep within the exception all injuries associated in any way with the "detention"
of goods. It must be admitted that this initial reading is not
ineluctable; as Judge Weis, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, pointed out, it is possible (with some effort) to read the
phrase, "in respect of" as the equivalent of "as regards" and
thereby to infer that "the statutory exception is directed to
the fact of detention itself, and that alone." 679 F. 2d, at
310. But we think that the fairest interpretation of the crucial portion of the provision is the one that first springs to
mind: "any claim arising in respect of" the detention of goods
means any claim "arising out of" the detention of goods, and
includes a claim resulting from negligent handling or storage
of detained property.
Relying on the analysis of the Second Circuit in Alliance
Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (1958), petitioner argues that the foregoing reading of the plain language
of§ 2680(c) is undercut by the context in which the provision
appears.
"That the exception does not and was not intended to bar
actions based on the negligent destruction, injury or loss
of goods in the possession or control of the customs authorities is best illustrated by the fact that the exception
immediately preceding it expressly bars actions 'arising
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission' of
mail. 28 U.S. C. §2680(b). If Congress had similarly
wished to bar actions based on the negligent loss of
goods which governmental agencies other than the
postal system undertook to handle, the exception in 28
(1926) (Cardozo, J .)). We think that the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify "those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception"-no less and no more. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S.
15, 31 (1953).
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U. S. C. § 2680(b) shows that it would have been equal to
the task. The conclusion is inescapable that it did not
choose to bestow upon all such agencies general absolution from carelessness in handling property belonging to
others." I d., at 534. 10
We find the conclusion reached by petitioner and the Second Circuit far from "inescapable." The specificity of
§ 2680(b), in contrast with the generality of § 2680(c), suggests, if anything, that Congress intended the former to be
less encompassing than the latter. The motivation for such
an intent is not hard to find. One of the principal purposes of
the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's
immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at
fault.u In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs
torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully
delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government
was not assuming financial responsibility-namely, "the loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter"-thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles. The absence of any analogous desire
to limit the reach of the statutory exception pertaining to the
detention of property by customs officials explains the lack of
comparable nicety in the phraseology of§ 2680(c).
B
The legislative history of § 2680(c), though meager, supports the interpretation of the provision that we have derived

°For reiterations of this argument, see A & D International , Inc. v.
United States , 665 F. 2d ," at 672; A-Mark , Inc . v. United States Secret
Service, 593 F. 2d, at 850.
11
See General Tort Bill: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1932) (testimony of Asst. Atty.
Gen. Rugg).
1
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from its language and context. Two specific aspects of the
evolution of the provision are telling. First, the person who
almost certainly drafted the language under consideration
clearly thought that it covered injury to detained property
caused by the negligence of customs officials. It appears
that the portion of § 2680(c) pertaining to the detention of
goods was first written by Jud~f, one of
the major figures in the development of the Tort Claims Act.
In his Report explicating his proposals, Judge Holtzoff
explained:
"[The proposed provision would exempt from the coverage of the Act] [c]laims arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty. This exception appears in all previous drafts. It is expanded,
however, so as to include immunity from liability in respect of loss in connection with the detention of goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs or excise. The
additional proviso has special reference to the detention
of imported goods in appraisers' warehouses or customs
houses, as well as seizures by law enforcement officials,
internal revenue officers, and the like." A. Holtzoff,
Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1931)
(Holtzoff Report) (emphasis added). 12
Though it cannot be definitively established that Congress
relied upon Judge Holtzoff's report, it is significant that the
12
Judge Holtzoff went on to explain that "[t]his provision is suggested in
the proposed draft of the bill submitted by the Crown Proceedings Committee in England in 1927.... " Holtzoff Report at 16. The relevant
portion of the bill to which Holtzoff referred was even more explicit:
"No proceedings shall lie under this section-

(c) for or in respect of the loss of or any deterioration or damage occasioned to, or any delay in the release of, any goods or merchandise by reason of anything done or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and
excise acting as such .... " Report of Crown Proceedings Comm.
§ 11(5)(c), pp. 17-18 (April 1927).
(It appears that this bill was never enacted into law in England.)
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apparent draftsman of the crucial portion of§ 2680(c) believed
that it would bar a suit of the sort brought by petitioner.
Second, the Congressional committees that submitted reports on the various bills that ultimately became the Tort
Claims Act suggested that the provision that was to become
§ 2680(c), like the other exceptions from the waiver of sovereign immunity, covered claims "arising out of" the designated
conduct. Thus, for example, the House Judiciary Committee described the proposed exceptions as follows:
"These exemptions cover claims arising out of the loss
or miscarriage of postal matter; the assessment or collection of taxes or assessments; the detention of goods by
customs officers; admiralty and maritime torts; deliberate torts such as assault and battery; and others."
H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Gong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). 13
The Com~ittees' casual us~f th~ w...Qrd~ J arising ou(3',"
with reference t o the exemption of claims pertaining to the
@"ep!I§Jbf goods substantially undermines petitioner'Scontentwn that the phrase, "in respect of," was designed to limit
the sorts of suits covered by the provision. 14
Of perhaps greater importance than these two clues as to
the meaning of the prepositional phrase contained in § 2680(c)
is the fact that our interpretation of the plain language of the
provision accords with what we know of Congress' general
purposes in creating exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. The
three objectives most often mentioned in the legislative history as rationales for the enumerated exceptions are: ensuring that "certain governmental activities" not be disrupted by
"the threat of damage suits"; avoiding exposure of the United
States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not
13
See also S. Rep . No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. , 33 (1946); S. Rep. No.
1196, 77th Cong. , 2d Sess. , 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. , 10 (1942).
1
' Cf. Kosak v. United States, 679 F . 2d, at 309 (Weis, J. , dissenting)
(discussed, supra, a t -).
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extending the coverage of the Act to suits "for which adequate remedies are already available." 15
The exemption of claims for damage to goods in the custody of customs officials is certainly consistent with the first
two of these purposes. One of the most important sanctions
available to the Customs Service in ensuring compliance with
the customs laws is its power to detain goods owned by suspected violators of those laws. 16 Congress may well have
wished not to dampen the enforcement efforts of the Service
by exposing the Government to private damage suits by disgruntled owners of detained property.
Congress may also have been concerned that a waiver of
immunity from suits alleging damage to detained property
would expose the United States to liability for fraudulent
claims. The Customs Service does not have the staff or resources it would need to inspect goods at the time it seizes
them. Lacking a record of the condition of a piece of prop-

"

15
For a variety of expressions of these three purposes, see S. Rep. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess., 6 (1945); Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 Before
the House Judiciary Comm., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1942) (testimony of
Asst. Atty. Gen. Shea); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings
on H. R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., 22 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff); Hearings,
supra note 11, at 17 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Rugg); Holtzoff Report, at 15. To our knowledge, the only arguably relevant specific statement as to the purpose of § 2680(c) appears in the testimony of Judge
Holtzoff before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Holtzoff emphasized the adequacy of existing remedies as a justification for
the portion of the provision pertaining to the recovery of improperly collected taxes; he did not proffer an explanation for the portion of the provision pertaining to the detention of goods. Tort Claims Against the United
States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38 (1940).
16
See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1594 (authorizing seizure of "a vessel or vehicle" to force payment of assessed penalties); 19 U. S. C. § 1595a(a) (authorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the illegal importation of
other goods); 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(1), (4) (authorizing seizure of controlled
substances and conveyances used to transport them).

I
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erty when the Service took custody of it, the Government
would be in a poor position to defend a suit in which the
owner alleged that the item was returned in damaged condition. 17 Congress may have reasoned that the frequency with
which the Government would be obliged to pay undeserving
claimants if it waived immunity from such suits offset the inequity, resulting from retention of immunity, to persons with
legitimate grievances.
To a lesser extent, our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent
with the third articulated purpose of the exceptions to the
Tort Claims Act. At common law, a property owner had
(and retains) a right to bring suit against an individual customs official who negligently damaged his goods. 18 28
U. S. C. § 2006 provides that judgments in such suits shall be
paid out of the federal Treasury if a court certifies that there
existed probable cause for the detention of the goods and that
the official was acting under the directions of an appropriate
supervisor. 19 Congress in 1946 may have concluded that this
mode of obtaining recompense from the United States (or
from an individual officer) was "adequate." To be sure,
The Government's vulnerability to fraudulent claims would be especially great in a case in which the Customs Service took custody of the
goods from a shipper rather than from the owner. The shipper would contend that it exercised due care in the handling of the goods. The owner
would demonstrate that he received the goods in damaged condition. In
the absence of an extensive system for accounting for the movements and
treatment of property in its custody, the Customs Service would be hard
pressed to establish that its employees were not at fault. We do not suggest that such a dilemma would automatically give rise to liability on the
part of the United States; that of course would depend upon the substance
of the pertinent state tort law. See 28 U. S. C.§§ 1346(b), 2674. But uneasiness at the prospect of such scenarios may have influenced Congress
when it carved out this exception to the Tort Claims Act.
18
See, e. g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F. 2d 1146, 1149
(CA4 1974); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774, 775 (CA2 1944); J.
Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments §§ 613, 618, at 387, 390
(1832).
19
See State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, supra, at 1149-1150.
17
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there are significant limitations to the common-law remedy,
the most important of which is the apparent requirement that
the plaintiff prove negligence on the part of a particular customs official. 20 Such proof will often be difficult to come by.
But Congress may well have concluded that exposing the
United States to liability for injury to property in the custody
of the Customs Service under circumstances in which the
owner is not able to demonstrate such specific negligence
would open the door to an excessive number of fraudulent
suits. 21
III
Petitioner and some commentators argue that that
§ 2680(c) should not be construed in a fashion that denies an
effectual remedy to many persons whose property is damaged through the tortious conduct of customs officials. 22
That contention has force, but it is properly addressed to
Congress, not to this Court. The language of the statute as
At oral argument, the Government contended that a property owner
could recover against the United States under this composite theory by
bringing suit against the relevant District Director of the Customs Service
and would not be obliged to prove negligence on the part of any specific
customs official. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Though we do not decide the
issue, such an interpetation of the common-law doctrine appears questionable to us. Except in cases in which the property owner could demonstrate that the Director expressly authorized tortious conduct by a subordinate, it seems likely that the owner would be obliged to identify and
bring suit against the individual whose malfeasance caused the injury to his
goods.
21
We note that there exists at least one other remedial system that
might enable someone in petitioner's position to obtain compensation from
the Government. If the owner of property detained by the Customs Service were able to establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract of
bailment between himself and the Service, he could bring suit under the
Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United
States, 444 U. S. 460 (1980).
22
Comment, Governmental Liability for Customs Officials' Negligence:
Kosak v. United States, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1040 (1983); Note, Using the
Federal Tort Claims Act to Remedy Property Damage Following Customs
Service Seizures,-- U. Mich. J . of L. Reform-- (1984).
20
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it was written leaves us no choice but to affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals that the Tort Claims Act does not
cover suits alleging that customs officials injured property
that had been detained by the Customs Service.
It is so ordered.
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